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PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
GOVERNMENT: ADDRESSING PROCESS EFFICIENCIES IN THE 
CREATION OF LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
RAMSIN G. CANON*
INTRODUCTION
Local government control of land uses is a strong tradition in Ameri-
can law, stretching back to the colonial era. Land use planning is meant to 
balance individual property rights with the public good, understood in turn, 
as efficient and harmonious use of land. The early 20th Century saw the 
widespread adoption of zoning and planning codes by local governments, 
authorized to do so by state legislatures. The policy shift away from plan-
ning and towards “market solutions” in the late 20th Century resulted in a 
drop in federal and state support for cities. Planning codes were adapted to 
serve as vehicles for entrepreneurial governments to encourage economic 
development as a means for generating tax revenue. Development agree-
ments between governments and developers, -essentially bilateral agree-
ments that govern the terms of a particular project, and related instruments, 
such as planned developments- have become increasingly necessary to 
provide needed flexibility, entice economic growth, and mitigate risks for 
developers investing significant capital. Development agreements allow 
governments to seek benefits from developers, in exchange for certainty 
and freedom from zoning regulations for the developer. 
However, development agreements that create particularly intense 
land uses —e.g., high-density, high-traffic, environmentally impactful— 
raise issues and risks of their own. In particular, courts may invalidate them 
as impermissible delegation of government power upon challenges from 
project opponents or recalcitrant governments. Additionally, cities that 
undergo a change in socio-economic circumstances incompatible with a 
previously agreed upon project, risk significant damages should they refuse 
to perform according to an agreement. More generally, opposition from a 
* J.D., 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., 2003 University of Illinois-Chicago. I would like to 
thank Professor Sarah Harding and Luke Harriman for their invaluable guidance and immeasurably 
beneficial edits. I would also like to thank Waleeta, Malin, and Yousip Canon for their support and 
patience with me through this process. 
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community may force unprofitable alterations to, or outright rejection of, a 
project.
Alternative models of planning based broadly on principles of trans-
parency and cooperation may be instructive towards addressing these prob-
lems. By using principles of mutual-gains negotiation and participatory
problem solving as guideposts, reforms or fixes to planning processes may 
mitigate risk to the parties to a development agreement and enhance the 
certainty for the development party. The alternatives detailed herein aspire 
to provide such protections. 
This Note will argue that development agreements, while conferring 
great benefits in terms of flexibility, also give rise to normative deficiencies 
in the form of risk of litigation and process inefficiencies. These deficien-
cies are by no means fatal to development agreements. Straightforward 
legislative and administrative mechanisms can address them. 
In the area of land use planning, development agreements are bi-
lateral agreements between developers1 and local governments2 that control 
the terms of a particular development project by binding both parties to 
procedural steps and vesting certain rights for the developers and creating 
responsibilities for both sides.3 Localities can both limit externalities and 
protect themselves from failed developments or unused entitlements. This 
is accomplished by extracting voluntary agreements from the developer for 
remediation of land use impacts (such as environmental hazards or in-
creased traffic) and provision of infrastructure. Developers in turn may 
freeze regulations to those in place at the time of the agreement or secure 
exceptions to regulations, define the terms by which the project must de-
velop, and extract guarantees of administrative swiftness and approvals for 
zoning or other entitlements. Development agreements will often include 
the creation of planned use development (PD or PUD) designations to en-
sure flexibility as to use guidelines. PDs are detailed development plans for 
 1. This Note will use the term “developers” as short hand for the diversity of individuals and 
entities, and combinations of those individuals and entities that enter into development agreements with 
local governments. Developers may be individual property owners, financers, or developers under 
contract with property owners, partnerships of property owners and financers, or holding companies 
that include combinations of these different parties. 
 2. This Note will focus on local development agreements between municipalities or counties and 
development parties. However, state governments, specialty government districts, and the federal 
government could also enter into development agreements. 
 3. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Development Agreements, SU010 ALI-ABA 175, 
177 (2012); John J. Delaney, The Development Agreement: An Evolving Vehicle for Avoiding Vapid 
Vesting Vapors, SM004 ALI-ABA 1211, 1218 (2006).  
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large properties, typically with a variety of uses (often termed “mixed us-
es”), that act as their own zoning designation.4
This Note is organized as follows. Section II provides background on 
the land use planning process and the role of the development agreement as 
a policy tool in that process. Section III details the specifics of development 
agreements and considers how they have been treated by state courts. Sec-
tion IV analyzes recently developed alternative, participatory models of 
land use planning meant to address the legislative inefficiencies and legal 
weaknesses of development agreements. Section V proposes practical re-
forms for enhancing participation in the development agreement process to 
better insulate those agreements from judicial challenge. Section V con-
cludes the Note. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PLANNING PROCESS & THE HISTORICAL
CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
Land use planning has features of both the normal exercise of police 
powers and “quasi-judicial”5 exercises of state power that implicate due 
process concerns. Understanding the quirks of land use planning as a body 
of public policy is key to understanding its tools, including development 
agreements. In order to better understand development agreements as poli-
cy tools, this section will detail the typical features of the land use planning 
 4. JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 7:17 (3d ed. 2013) (“Planned unit developments are basically 
designed to permit the development of entire neighborhoods, or in some cases even towns, based on an 
approved plan. The completed development usually includes a variety of residential types, common 
open space for recreation, parks, and in some cases, commercial or even industrial areas. Since the 
entire project is preplanned the completed development can be based upon a logical and coherent 
mixture of uses. 
  The PUD principle is that a land area under unified control can be designed and developed in a 
single operation, usually by a series of prescheduled phases, and according to an officially approved 
“plan.” The plan does not necessarily have to correspond to the property and use regulations of the 
zoning district in which the development is located. As can be seen from the definition, the planned unit 
development concept abandons the lot by lot approach to development, and is primarily an alternative 
to zoning. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Frankland v. City of Lake Oswego, listed to following 
objectives of planned unit developments: (1) to achieve flexibility; (2) to provide a more desirable 
living environment than would be possible through the strict application of zoning ordinance require-
ments; (3) to encourage developers to use a more creative approach in their development of land; (4) to 
encourage a more efficient and more desirable use of open land; and (5) to encourage variety in the 
physical development pattern of the city.”). 
 5.  Specific land use decisions have often been characterized by courts and legislatures as “quasi-
judicial” exercises of state power, see generally ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, DAREN A. RATHKOPF &
EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., 3 RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 40:21 (4th ed. 2013) 
(“Characteristics primarily cited in identifying a rezoning as quasi-judicial are the facts that: (1) A 
decision has a great impact upon a limited number of persons or property owners while having compar-
atively little impact on the community at large. (2) The proceeding is aimed at arriving at a fact based 
decision between two distinct alternatives, i.e., pro or con. (3) The decision, viewed functionally and 
analytically, presents an instance of policy application rather than policy setting.”). 
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process and the historical context that gave rise to development agree-
ments. This understanding sets the stage for identifying and addressing the 
inherent deficiencies of development agreements. 
A. The Typical Land Use Planning Process 
Localities control the use of land through zoning maps and ordinances 
that define, proscribe and prescribe uses,6 and master or comprehensive 
plans that designate certain parcels and areas for particular types of uses. 
This type of control of land use by local governments is as old as American 
law itself,7 and is not only for the purpose of mitigating nuisances.8
The Massachusetts colony’s proto-land use laws operated a sort of 
quasi or negative zoning by forbidding the building of residences too re-
mote from town centers or “a place of public worship.” In Virginia, laws 
discouraged absentee landlords by favoring squatters who made good use 
of property over titleholders who left property fallow, “requir[ing] owners 
of certain town lots to build houses on their lots or have the lots sold to new 
purchasers.”9 These two examples underlie two of the central thrusts of 
comprehensive land use and urban planning: orderly, harmonious devel-
opment and efficient use of land for the benefit of the community. 
Today, communities prepare comprehensive land use plans as regula-
tory guidelines. Like the laws of yore, these plans bring predictability to 
communities10 in a way that reflects public policy objectives. That is, they 
allow property owners to better plan for the use of their own land because 
property owners know not only what is permitted, but whether their intend-
 6.  For example, an “R” zone where parcels may be used for residential purposes, with “R-1” “R-
2” “R-3” etc., indicating increasing intensity of the use, such that an “R-1” zone would permit large-lot 
single family homes, and R-3 would permit townhomes and low-rise apartment complexes, with higher 
dwelling-per-acre ratios. Other zoning designations would include Commercial uses such as strip malls, 
shopping districts, and big-box stores; industrial uses including manufacturing, warehousing, waste-
transfer stations, and so on. Typically, agricultural zones, permitting basic agricultural uses, are consid-
ered the “lowest” or least-intense use designation. 
 7.  John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257 (1996). 
 8.  Id.
 9.  Id. at 1277. 
 10.  See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish Cnt’y., 480 P.2d 489, 495 (Wash. 1971) (en banc) (“[W]e 
start with the premise that comprehensive planning and zoning proposes and imposes limitations upon 
the free and unhampered use of private as well as public property, and when such regulations are once 
enacted, the indiscriminate amendment, modification or alteration thereof tends to disturb that degree of 
stability and continuity in the usage of land to which affected landowners are entitled to look in the 
orderly occupation, enjoyment, and development of their properties. Perforce, by the very nature of our 
society, the initial imposition of zoning restrictions or the subsequent modification of adopted regula-
tions compels the highest public confidence in the governmental processes bringing about such ac-
tion.”) (emphasis added). 
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ed use will be served or harmed by the future uses of surrounding and 
nearby properties.11
The distinction between containing nuisance and pursuing the public 
good is an important one. In other words, comprehensive land use planning 
is not meant solely to protect property interests from interference, but exer-
cising state power to improve the quality of life of the community in gen-
eral—e.g., the “better populating and Inhabiting” of the community’s 
physical space to benefit the individuals that make it up.12
While the abstract principles of “harmony,” “orderliness,” and “effi-
ciency,” help define comprehensive land use planning conceptually, they 
also give rise to questions. For example, harmony with what? Orderliness 
by what rubric? Efficiency towards achieving what ends?13 The breadth of 
opinion on these questions is too great to be addressed in this Note.14 Suf-
fice it to say that regulating the uses of land for some general conception of 
the public benefit, rather than purely as a means of protecting the rights of 
individuals vis-à-vis one another or the state, underlies the control of land 
use.
Land use planning and zoning is calibrated to the public good, within 
the parameters created by property rights. Where zoning, particularly ex-
clusive zoning,15 generally proscribes uses by property owners,16 planning, 
in the form of master or comprehensive plans, is more prescriptive in that it 
details shared public goals and the means for achieving those goals.17 Mas-
 11. The most quotidian example of what could happen without the predictability of harmonious-
ness or efficient use of land: the family who buys a single family home near undeveloped land, only to 
find a high-traffic waste transfer station is to be developed there. The constant rumble of trucks, poten-
tial waste runoff or smells, and the stigma of living near a trash dump may act to injure the family’s 
enjoyment of their own property and see a loss in value of their investment. 
 12. See Hart, supra note 7, at 1279 n.8. 
 13. See, e.g., E. Hekkila, The Economics of Planning, in PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND 
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 24-26 (Daniel R. Mandelker et. al., 8th ed. 2011).  
 14.  As one example of the ideologically disparate approaches to land use policy, both Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels engaged the topic, Engels in his criticism of “town planning” in Manchester in 
THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND (Tim Delaney ed. 1998) (1845), and Marx 
writing that the study of humanity required that “the first fact to be established is the physical organiza-
tion of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature,” quoted in ERICH FROMM,
MARX’S CONCEPT OF MAN 14 (1917) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
 15.  As compared to classic cumulative zoning; where in cumulative zoning, “higher” designa-
tions permit by incorporation all of the uses from “lower” designations (i.e., Industrial-6 would permit 
all of the uses permitted in Industrial-1 through -5), in exclusive zoning each designation permits only 
those uses enumerated for that designation. 
 16.  E.g., by explicitly limiting what uses a particularly property can be put toward. 
 17. .Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1154-
55 (1955). Haar provides a useful and concise definition of the comprehensive plan as an instrument of 
public policy: 
The basic instrument of city planning is the “master plan.” This master plan, a “comprehen-
sive, long-term general plan” for the physical development of the community, embodies in-
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ter and comprehensive plans are typically not binding on property owners 
and local governments in the way that zoning ordinances are.18
The Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA),19 created by the Depart-
ment of Commerce under then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in 
192120, provides21 that zoning ordinances should be prepared “in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan.”22 While courts have construed this provi-
sion broadly, localities have taken to preparing Master or Comprehensive 
Plans that detail how a community should develop physically. Comprehen-
sive plans are unlike legislative enactments in that they are developed by 
insulated planning bodies rather than legislators. Communities will retain 
outside parties to gather demographic, economic, environmental, and phys-
ical data about a community. Governments then use this data to determine 
desirable or ideal outcomes for the community as a whole.23 It is neverthe-
less necessary to make an initial policy determination or set of determina-
tions that will guide the drafting parties’ application of the data. 
An example24 would be a city’s housing policy. An initial determina-
tion—or goal—”to ensure safe housing at a reasonable cost to residents,” 
will in turn direct the substance of a set of objectives meant to define and 
achieve that goal. The objectives would be, for example, achieving a port-
folio of housing options, which, at its median, would be easily affordable 
formation, judgments, and objectives collected and formulated by experts to serve as both a 
guiding and predictive force. Based on comprehensive surveys and analyses of existing so-
cial, economic, and physical conditions in the community and of the factors which generate 
them, the plan directs attention to the goals selected by the community from the various alter-
natives propounded and clarified by planning experts, and delimits the means (within availa-
ble resources) for arriving at these objectives. With different local agencies concentrating on 
streets, parks, roads, and schools, and with the increasing tendency to delegate new tech-
niques such as urban renewal or public housing to ad hoc authorities, there is danger that di-
verse legislative activities affecting the physical environment will not be coordinated, and that 
inefficiencies, inconsistencies, and waste will result. And in the press of day-to-day determi-
nations in the field of land use, it is vital that there be some concrete unifying factor providing 
scope and perspective. Hence the need for city planning and the master plan, “guiding and ac-
complishing,” in the words of the Pennsylvania enabling statute, “a coordinated, adjusted, and 
harmonious development of the city . . . .” 
Id.
 18. .Id. at 1157. 
 19.  Ruth Knack, Stuart Meck, & Israel Stollman, Commentary: The Real Story Behind the Stand-
ard Planning and Zoning Acts of the 1920s, LAND USE LAW, Feb. 1996, at 3, 3, 
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/LULZDFeb96.pdf. 
 20.  The SZEA is not a piece of legislation, but a model for state statutes enabling localities to 
engage in land use planning and zoning. See id at 9 n.21. 
 21.  The SZEA provides a useful standard model for the purposes of this Note; it should be under-
stood that a particular community’s zoning code would resemble the requirements of a model state 
zoning act or the elements in a zoning enabling statute. 
 22.  Haar, supra note 17, at 1157. 
 23.  Haar, supra note 17, at 1155. 
 24.  See MANDELKER, supra note 13, at 35. 
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for the median income family in the community. To achieve these objec-
tives, a comprehensive plan will include detailed policies, such as dedicat-
ing un-annexed areas to multi-family residential developments; the use of 
bonuses to developers to encourage dense housing; and reserving space and 
dedications and easements for parks, schools, access roads, sewage lines, 
etc. 
Land use planning, and in particular comprehensive plans, therefore 
reflect the political priorities and values of the community they mean to 
plan, even if they are technical in substance.25 Zoning in conformity with 
plans requires legislatures to exercise what discretion is available to them 
in harmony with the political priorities of the community as a whole. 
Insofar as development agreements in particular permit ad hoc or in-
tense departures from those plans, they may tend to subvert the expectation 
of the community represented by the comprehensive plan. 
B. Development Agreements as a Necessary Tool for “Entrepreneurial” 
Government
The growing use of development agreements and related26 planning 
tools by local governments is a result of the change in urban planning over 
the last forty years. Development agreements and related instruments are 
important tools for localities. Nevertheless, they differ from typical gov-
ernment contracting because they are not procurement (as with, for exam-
ple, the purchase of professional services) or delegation (as with 
privatization of a social service) but rather a form of actual governance
through private negotiation. Often, among the products of an agreement is a 
legislative action, such a vote by a City Council to rezone a property. While 
this may undermine public trust in the government and its own police pow-
ers, the evolution of urban land use planning creates a compelling need for 
policy tools like development agreements absent larger, national policy 
changes.
 25.  Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 517 (1979) 
(Remarking on the nature of “incrementalist” policy analysis and creation as “[a]nalysis marked by a 
mutually supporting set of simplifying  and focusing stratagems of which simple incremental analysis is 
only one, the others being those listed in my article of 20 years ago: specifically, . . . an intertwining of 
analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem . . . .”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 26. While this Note will deal with development agreements, it is important to note the two related 
types of planning tools, annexation agreements and planned developments that share many of the same 
features. Both annexation agreements and planned developments contemplate bi-lateral agreements 
between development parties and governments, detail with particularity intense uses of land, and place 
conditions on approval that require consideration from development parties and some degree of com-
mitment from governments. Development agreements will often entail a planned development. 
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The key to understanding the need for development agreements is to 
understand the shift in the role of local government with the onset of gov-
ernment policy neoliberalization27 in the 1970s. Neoliberalization impacted 
local governments in various ways, but the most directly relevant are, first, 
the shift in federal policy away from direct spending of federal tax dollars 
on local programs to “pro-growth” policies28 and, second, the liberalization 
of trade and regulatory regimes that introduced international competitive 
pressures on localities, particularly manufacturing, which eroded local tax 
revenues.29 The abandonment of federal and state commitments to infra-
structure and social welfare programs required localities to resort to debt 
(in the form of bonds) and the active pursuit of capital investment30 to 
make up budgetary shortfalls.31 The introduction of international competi-
tive pressures made this need more acute. 
In the pre-neoliberal Keynesian context32 cities behaved more mana-
gerially, responsible for administering programs like public housing and 
developing complex versions of regulatory regimes like Euclidean zon-
ing,33 as well as encouraging business development and protecting labor 
interests.34 When city governments were “disciplined” by a loss of federal 
and state funds, they were expected to either shrink in size or find private 
sources for revenue—the antithesis of the Keynesian principles of recession 
response.35 Both to avoid capital flight36 and to attract new capital, there-
 27. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (“Neoliberalism is . . . a 
theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills, within an institutional framework character-
ized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.”). 
 28. See Helga Leitner, Cities in Pursuit of Economic Growth: The Local State as Entrepreneur,
POL. GEOGRAPHY Q., 9:146, 149-51 (1990). 
 29.  See generally, JASON HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN URBANISM (2007). 
 30. The assumption being that with more investment, the locality’s tax base would increase. 
 31. HACKWORTH, supra note 30 at 24 (“Cities became more entrepreneurial in part to cover the 
budgetary shortfalls that accompanied this transition. . .[not] as commonly acknowledged. . .is the 
increasing reliance of cities on debt for social service and capital infrastructure.”) (citations omitted). 
 32. In Keynesian economics, central government spending is used to counteract the vagaries of the 
business cycle; as a function of this general principle, localities had a “managerial” role to play in 
administering that spending and balancing social and economic stability with growth. See HACKWORTH
supra note 30 at 26 (Phenomena such as Euclidean zoning, property taxes, and public housing were 
“justifiable in part because they fit within the ideological bounds of Keynesian managerialism in partic-
ular and egalitarian liberalism in general.”) (citation omitted). 
 33. For a full discussion of Euclidean zoning, see infra part II.A. 
 34. See HACKWORTH, supra note 29, at 8-9. 
 35. Keynesian orthodoxy indicates for an expansion of government in times of economic contrac-
tion.
 36. HACKWORTH, supra note 29, at 17 (referencing the presumption that capital flight motivates 
city’s decision-making). 
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fore, cities must act entrepreneurially, engaging businesses and enticing 
them to develop new projects.37
Enticing investment can take many forms, of course. Among these are 
tax incentives38 like tax-increment financing (“TIF”) overlay districts or 
sales tax rebates, direct subsidies, and “particularized”39 regulations that 
permit the government to be more flexible to the needs of developers. 
Developers want to mitigate the unpredictability and vicissitudes of 
the administrative and legislative process; it reduces risk by vesting con-
tractual rights, and thus ensuring predictability.40 In turn, local govern-
ments get assurances as to use and the development party is able to plan for 
the long-term, secure financing by defining the terms of the regulation ap-
plicable to a piece of property through a bi-lateral agreement. 
Thus, the development agreement and related instruments have come 
to serve a critical role for localities. In a national policy regime that com-
pels local governments to act as entrepreneurs, stoking economic growth to 
maintain or grow revenues, tools that allow ad hoc tailoring of regulations 
are critical. The flexibility and assurances they offer makes them invalua-
ble. However, their very nature, walking a thin line between contract and 
conditional zoning, and the competitive pressure to obscure them from the 
public until the point where a proposal is ready to move forward, create 
risks of their own. 
III. CONTOURS AND LEGALITY OF DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
Not all development agreements are the same, nor are they inherently 
controversial. The use of development agreements to mitigate externalities 
not otherwise addressed by permitting is precisely the type of thing city 
planning departments are meant to do. It is the problematic agreements that 
create high-intensity or dense uses and require some quasi-judicial or legis-
 37. Leitner, supra note 28, at 147 (“[Cities’] preoccupation with local economic growth has been 
imposed on the process of urban land development. In numerous cities, the local state has moved be-
yond its traditional activities of land-use control and planning and the provision of public services to 
become a major player in urban land development.”). 
 38. Id. (“[A] greater amount and new variety of financial incentives are now made available to 
developers and businesses for property development; incentives which range from tax abatements and 
rebates to land-purchase subsidies, low-interest loans, loan guarantees and equity-financing.”). 
 39. Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land 
Use Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 349 (2002) (“[L]and use decision-making has shifted 
significantly from the planned toward the particularized, affording more ad hoc responses to individual 
development proposals.”). 
 40. See Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning that is Neither Illegal 
Contract Zoning nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. L. REV. 383, 393 (2004) (“Though zoning ordinances 
contain standards for granting variances and special use permits and exceptions, these devices retain an 
ad hoc flavor and their application is not entirely predictable.”). 
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lative action by the locality that are the subject of this Note. It is those 
types of projects that most require flexible bilateral agreements; these pro-
jects are also more likely to attract negative public attention and litigation. 
This section therefore will consider development agreements in general, 
and then consider the inefficiency phenomena that arise from those agree-
ments that entail higher-intensity or inherently controversial proposals. 
A. Development Agreements in Practice 
While development agreements are sometimes presumed to be within 
the police power of local governments. Many state legislatures have passed 
authorizing statutes to grant localities the explicit power to enter into de-
velopment agreements, and define those powers.41 These statutes create 
procedures for entering into development agreements, necessary elements 
of those agreements, and limits to what a local government can negotiate. 
Development agreements evolved as flexible alternatives to planning 
within rigid Euclidean42 zoning.43 In a strict Euclidean regime, districts are 
zoned for narrow sets of uses according to a comprehensive planning doc-
ument. Development agreements make exceptions to the structures of these 
zoning districts, incorporate mixtures of uses, and otherwise carve out an 
area within a zoning district that does not conform to the surrounding us-
es.44 Development agreements may also include a requirement for letters of 
 41. Id. at 395 n.65. Among the states explicitly authorizing states to engage in development 
agreements are California, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, 
New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and Texas.  
 42. . Modern zoning regimes are typically sourced to the Supreme Court case Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Corp. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, the Court upheld a municipal zoning ordinance 
against Takings and Due Process challenges by a realtor who alleged that the zoning ordinance affected 
a Fifth Amendment taking by seriously diminishing the value of their property. Id at 396-97. 
 43. See Green, supra note 40, at 389. 
 44. It may be useful as a conceptual tool to provide an example here. Often development agree-
ments will spell out subdivisions of land, rezoning of different parcels, and the various special use 
permits and zoning variances or exceptions that will be provided in order to permit legal development 
of a particular project. A common example would be a development party purchasing a large tract of 
land at the edge of a city zoned Agricultural or Rural, but designated in the Comprehensive Plan for 
low-density residential development. The development party may be planning to build a dense, “new 
urbanist” style project, which blends low-rise luxury apartments and small-lot single family homes 
surrounding a small shopping district with office space and housing above storefronts, and mixed in 
with recreational facilities, music venues and theaters, department stores, restaurants, banks, filling 
stations, and bars. Within a Euclidean context, this would require subdivision of lots, with many lots 
falling outside of any neat zoning classification—for example, a commercial strip with condominiums 
and office space above storefronts and backed by parking structures. Therefore detailed “planned 
development” re-zonings would be necessary in order to provide the development party with the re-
quired legal relief, while allowing the locality sufficient control to permit only that which would be 
amenable to the community and harmonious with surrounding uses, to the finest detail—such as height 
and style of lighting fixtures, positioning of garbage dumps, hours of operation and ingress and egress 
points for cars. To orderly develop such a project, it would also be necessary to build in phases, to 
match housing with infrastructure (such as roads, traffic lights, and sewer hook-ups) and limit commer-
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credit or sureties in case a development fails or the development party loses 
funding, create requirements for infrastructure such as sewer lines and 
roads, and easements for bike trails, parks or green space. Without a devel-
opment agreement, complex plans would require numerous variances, re-
zonings, and special use permits, each with its own (often long) process. 
These agreements therefore significantly condense what would otherwise 
be a multifarious and often duplicative process.45 Developers can better 
secure financing and integrate the elements necessary to minimize potential 
conflicts with surrounding uses and comprehensive plan objectives. 
At the same time, localities can avoid the risks of granting sweeping 
entitlements, such as high-intensity zoning designations, absorbing the cost 
of externalities, and the potential judicial scrutiny46 that would otherwise 
come from imposing conditions on the granting of entitlements. A broad 
entitlement granted without a development agreement opens up the possi-
bility of developers changing their plans for the property to something 
more noxious to neighbors but still within a zoning district’s use limita-
tions, or the subsequent auctioning of that property to developers with po-
tentially less savory projects in mind. 
The “bargained-for zoning” that development agreements create does 
come with drawbacks, particularly in the context of civil society and effi-
ciency and efficacy of land use planning. 
B. Inefficiencies of Development Agreements in Practice 
This section deals with inefficiencies common to the development 
agreement process, particularly those arising from litigation and public 
opposition to development agreements. As throughout this Note, of greater 
concern are those development agreements that contemplate particularly 
cial developments to what the number of “rooftops” (residences) can support. However, because phased 
development still requires a long-term plan, developing without assurance of future land use relief could 
jeopardize the early phases. 
 45. Each subdivision, zoning change, special use permit, and variance would require a hearing 
because zoning ordinances treat such actions as legislative decisions requiring administrative or quasi-
judicial hearings and legislative votes. Creating a large-scale mixed-use development would therefore 
require numerous hearings and votes for what is essentially a single integrated project with overlapping 
externalities, costs, and impacts. Thus, the timeline for full approval is extended and each element of 
the project becomes subject to political opposition or escalating of demands from the local government. 
 46. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374 (1994), the lynchpin cases of takings and exactions jurisprudence. The holdings of Nollan
and Dolan arose as a consequence of planning bodies attempting to mitigate the impacts and externali-
ties of new or more intense developments by conditioning zoning relief on easements or dedications of 
land. The so-called “regulatory takings” jurisprudence that developed subsequent to Nollan and Dolan
would understandably make planning bodies reticent to unilaterally impose conditions on development 
parties seeking land use relief. 
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intense uses; commonly, agreements that provide for high-density mixed-
use or planned development projects or noxious or inherently disruptive 
uses (such as landfills or industrial facilities). 
1. State of litigation surrounding development agreements 
The common elements of a useful development agreement subject it to 
several potentially actionable issues: contract zoning, conditional zoning, 
and common law breach of contract or default based on a change in public 
policy. Whether or not litigation over these issues is frequent is not as ger-
mane as the inherent risk they represent. After all, amelioration of risk is 
the purpose of entering into development agreements in the first place. 
Two types of litigation primarily tend to arise from development 
agreements: enforcement actions and challenges to the terms or validity of 
an agreement premised on the contract or conditional zoning theories. Of 
particular relevance to the subject matter of this Note are challenges by 
parties or interested citizens to the validity of the agreement and challenges 
by developers to compel performance of the contract particularly as to zon-
ing relief. The cases considered in this section show the broad spectrum of 
potential legal weaknesses inherent to development agreements. Particular 
reforms can reinforce development agreements’ legality by identifying 
these weaknesses. 
The federal courts’ doctrinal aversion47 to hearing land use cases 
shunts those cases to state courts. This means that there is considerable 
disuniformity across jurisdictions. Also, the reporters do not show a huge 
number of cases litigating development agreements themselves. However, 
by identifying those elements of development agreements that give rise to 
litigation, we can better understand how to remedy the development 
agreement process to eliminate those problematic elements and minimize 
risk for all parties. 
a. Commitments to Zoning Entitlements, or Contract Zoning 
Developers have a strong incentive to seek a commitment from the 
government to grant a zoning entitlement at the point where a project is 
ready to move forward (i.e., with detailed plans and financing in place). 
 47. Federal courts prefer to leave land use issues to state courts. See, e.g., Land Use Regulation, 
the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1134 (1980) (“Despite frequent 
invitations to impose constitutional restraints on local government regulation of private land use, the 
federal judiciary has consistently declined ‘to sit as a zoning board of appeals.’”).  
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However, this may create the appearance—or reality—of so-called contract 
zoning.48
Contract zoning describes a situation where a local government agrees 
to grant zoning relief in return for commitments from a property owner. 
The violation occurs when a government impermissibly contracts away its 
reserved powers.49 Legislative action approving such a contract is ultra 
vires as an initial matter50 because a legislature may not bind itself (or fu-
ture legislatures) from exercising its reserved power to legislate for the 
health, safety, and general welfare.51 Relatedly, contract zoning would be 
impermissible because zoning statutes detail mandatory processes for re-
zonings, and a contract to re-zone, even if it acknowledges the process, 
makes the administrative process merely pro forma.52
An example may help illustrate the following cases: imagine a plot of 
land, about the size of a city block, in a small city. The property is made up 
of thirty two-story townhomes in poor condition, and the neighboring 
blocks are mostly small single-family lots and two and three story walk-up 
apartment buildings, with a few retail storefronts. A developer purchases 
the block and the townhomes are incrementally demolished as the leases 
expire. The purchaser intends to build mid-rise (six to eight stories) luxury 
housing for families, with retail stores and office space on the ground floor. 
The townhomes previously on the site housed thirty families. The mid-rises 
will house 96 families. There will also be six new businesses, including a 
planned small grocery and a restaurant. The zoning code lacks a provision 
for mixing residential uses (the apartments) with high traffic retail uses 
 48. Green, supra note 40, at 403-07. 
 49. McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) 
(“The process is suspect because of the concern that a municipality will contract away its police power 
to regulate on behalf of the public in return for contractual benefits offered by a landowner whose 
interest is principally served by the zoning action.”). 
 50. 112 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 343 Zoning § 1 (2010) (“Further, such an agreement made 
by the zoning authorities to zone or rezone for the benefit of a private landowner is often condemned as 
an ultra vires use of the municipality’s police power.”). 
 51. However because local governments are creatures of statute, a state legislature may authorize 
contract zoning. See 112 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 50 (“In jurisdictions that do not 
have a statute specifically permitting contract zoning, this practice has been found illegal by numerous 
state courts.”) (emphasis added). 
 52. League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of L. A., 498 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“The district court’s analysis-a comparison between a traditional [conditional use permit 
(CUP)] and the terms of the Settlement Agreement-ignores the plain language of Los Angeles Munici-
pal Code § 12.08: All ‘conditional use’ is forbidden in an R1 zone unless ‘approved pursuant to the 
provisions of [Section 12.24].’ The question is not whether the Congregation has been granted, in all 
respects, the de facto equivalent of a CUP. The question, rather, is whether, within the framework of the 
City’s zoning ordinance, the Congregation could engage in the uses permitted by the Settlement 
Agreement without first obtaining a CUP. Therefore, we need only ask whether the Settlement Agree-
ment grants the Congregation permission to engage in a “conditional use” as defined by the ordinance 
that is forbidden in the absence of a valid CUP. If so, the statutory framework is triggered in full.”). 
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(like the grocery and the restaurant). The developer meets with city offi-
cials and asks that the area be rezoned as a “planned development.” The 
ordinance that would create the planned development would list the specif-
ic ways the property could be used, including how much parking would 
have to be provided, the maximum hours of operation of the retail uses, etc. 
The planning staff is concerned on the effect of more traffic on the 
surrounding blocks, the increased discharge to the sewer lines, and the 
effect of additional students on the neighborhood school. The developer is 
concerned that after buying the property and demolishing the homes, part-
nering with investors, and spending on attorneys, architects, and engineers, 
the city will ultimately deny the zoning he needs, leaving him with a less-
lucrative property and immense sunk costs. The city and the developer may 
then enter into a development agreement. The agreement commits the city 
to granting necessary entitlements if the project application meets all the 
technical requirements of the zoning code, and unless the Council is unable 
to make findings sufficient to meet the purposes of the code. The developer 
in exchange agrees to fair-share payments for road-widening, paying for 
additional sewer-line hook-ups, and a lump-sum payment to the school 
district to upgrade school facilities and purchase an additional bus. 
Ultimately, the City Council votes to deny the application for a 
planned development zoning after local residents organize to lobby the 
Council. The developer brings a suit to enforce the agreement, arguing that 
the Council could not deny his application so long as it met all the technical 
requirements, per the agreement. He petitions for a mandamus order to 
enforce the agreement; in addition he alleges breach of contract. What 
would be the result? The following cases all illustrate some aspect of this 
problem. The inclusion of a commitment by the government to re-zone a 
property has obvious advantages for developers, but it is also the most like-
ly element of a development agreement to attract negative scrutiny from 
courts and the public as violating the reserved powers doctrine.53 This type 
of contract zoning rarely survives legal challenges. The case of Morgran 
Co., Inc. v. Orange County54 is particularly instructive, as it shows just how 
little some courts are willing to tolerate when it comes to possible viola-
tions of the reserved powers doctrine. 
In Morgran, a developer entered into an agreement with Orange 
County, Florida, to dedicate ten or so acres of a four hundred acre property 
as a public park in exchange for, inter alia, a commitment by the County to 
 53. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879) (“Government is organized with a view to 
[preserving its police powers], and cannot divest itself of [those] power[s].”). 
 54. 818 So.2d 640, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
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“support” an application for the appropriate zoning relief. The zoning relief 
in Morgran, as in many development agreement scenarios, was for a 
planned unit development designation.55 The parkland would be dedicated 
upon the rezoning of the property. However when the developer decided to 
press forward with the rezoning application, the County executive directed 
his staff to treat it negatively and urged the planning bodies and the County 
commission to reject the application. The reasoning was simply because the 
developer wanted to build a dense mixed-use project that included signifi-
cant housing elements, and the county’s school system was already over-
burdened. The developer sued for enforcement of the agreement, arguing 
that a promise to merely “support” a rezoning was not an impermissible 
delegation away of police powers because it did not bind the government to 
a particular legislative outcome. On appeal, the Fifth District court rejected 
this “fine distinction”: 
Morgran responds that there is a distinction between an obligation to 
support the request for rezoning and an obligation to approve the request. 
They urge that both parties, aware of the law of contract zoning, devel-
oped this carefully worded, highly negotiated contract language that 
“does not purport, either impliedly or expressly, to restrict or any way in-
terfere with, the exercise of the Board of County Commissioner’s police 
power as the final zoning authority in the County.” This argument, we 
fear, draws too fine a distinction.56
The court was convinced that even a mere promise to “support” a re-
zoning would make a quasi-judicial57 process of rezoning into a “pro forma 
exercise.”58 It was not germane that the promise to support the application 
would have applied only to County staff (presumably, the planning office) 
and not the Board of Commissioners, because “the County is still the Coun-
ty.”59
Morgran is not merely an isolated case.60 Contract zoning is presuma-
bly if not per se illegal because of the violation of the reserved powers 
 55. Id. at 641-42. 
 56. Id. at 643. 
 57. Rezonings are typically considered quasi-judicial at least in part, where a public agency must 
make an inquiry as to the propriety of a change, balancing the property owner’s rights over their proper-
ty against the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. 
 58. Morgran, 818 So.2d at 643 (citing Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So.2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 59. Id. at 644. 
 60. . See Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360; County of Volusia v. Vill. of Wellington, 925 So. 2d 340, 
345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Miami, 397 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Hector v. City of Fargo, 760 N.W.2d 108, 115 (N.D. 2009) (conversations be-
tween city staff and developer did not of themselves rise to level of impermissible contract zoning); 
Childress v. Yadkin County, 650 S.E.2d 55, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (contract zoning impermissible in 
North Carolina because local government had a duty to exercise independent judgment in zoning deci-
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doctrine. This raises another serious issue for developers: not only may 
they be unable to enforce an agreement at the critical time when it is most 
necessary, but may not even estop a government from violating it. This is 
because of the equitable doctrine that states that a party cannot act in reli-
ance on a promise that if kept would be illegal.61 Thus, even if the develop-
er has paid some consideration, they may not be able to compel 
enforcement; and certainly, none of the costs they incur in reliance on a 
commitment to “support” a rezoning, including not only the financing of a 
plan, but potentially even the purchase of the land itself, could be recov-
ered.
However, the reserved powers doctrine is not sufficient to understand 
why contract zoning is often invalidated. If a legislature simply could not 
bind a future legislature to a particular course of action, then governments 
would find themselves unable to contract in a variety of ways.62 In Mor-
gran, the court cited to an Indiana case, Prock v. City of Danville63 where a 
contract between Danville and Waste Management, a trash hauler, was 
valid despite a promise to support an expansion of an existing use of the 
property as a landfill.64 The court in Prock found it persuasive that the 
property had already been re-zoned for a landfill from an agricultural use, 
and that the city had committed itself only to promising to support neces-
sary enhancements of that use insofar as those enhancements did not vio-
late the letter and spirit of the zoning code.65
The analyses and holdings of Prock and Morgran, together with the 
fact that governments may otherwise enter into contracts with private par-
ties, suggest that the problematic element of contract zoning is not the bind-
ing agreement itself, but the way in which the state came to bind itself.66 A 
commitment to rezone at some future time may not be unenforceable where 
two elements are met: first, if the government has reserved for itself the 
ability to act in the health, safety, and general welfare of the public; and, 
second, where the commitment itself was not the result of a bilateral 
sions); City of Bowie v. Mie Prop’s, Inc. 992 A.2d 509, 531 (Md. 2007) (an ultimate zoning authority is 
a necessary party to illegal contract zoning). 
 61. 818 So. 2d at 644; see also Brine v. Fertitta, 537 So. 2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 62. Green, supra note 40, at 407-08. 
 63. 655 N.E.2d 553, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
 64. The very fact that a Florida appellate court relied on an Indiana appellate court case to find 
persuasive authority—the case was not cited by either party—speaks to the unsettled nature of the 
jurisprudence on this issue. 
 65. 655 N.E.2d at 560-61.
 66. Green, supra note 40, at 408-09. 
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agreement but a truly public process acting as a substitution for the legisla-
tive authority otherwise being bypassed.67
b. Shifting Public Need and Common Law Breach 
While the illegality of contract zoning may insulate a government 
from compelled enforcement of a development agreement, the basic princi-
ples of common law breach can take a devastating toll on cities. This hap-
pened in the small town of Mammoth Lakes, California in 2010. More than 
a decade earlier, the town entered into a development agreement with a 
developer to build timeshare-style and residential housing near the town’s 
small regional airport to facilitate ski tourism.68 The town council approved 
the development agreement despite reservations expressed by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) about the proximity of the development to 
the airport. 
When time came for the project to move forward in 2004, the town 
had had a change in priority: rather than introduce more residential devel-
opment, the town recognized the need to expand its airport.69 This conflict-
ed with the construction of a dense housing development on land so near to 
the airport.70 As the developer pursued enforcement of the development 
agreement to build housing, town staff maneuvered to prevent that project 
from moving forward.71 Suspicious of the delays and statements coming 
from town staff, the developer (a successor to the original agreement) noti-
fied the city of its default. Eventually, they sued for specific performance 
of the agreement, and damages.72
The town answered the complaint by arguing inter alia that the suit 
was barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies,73 and that 
staff’s intransigence in moving the project forward could not be attributed 
to the town and thus could not rise to the level of a repudiation of the 
 67. Id.
 68. Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th 435, 
444 (Ct. App. 3d. 2010). 
 69. Id. at 449. 
 70. Id. at 448. 
 71. Id. at 449-51. 
 72. Id. at 452. 
 73. As with as-applied challenges to statutes generally, the principle that a plaintiff may not sue 
until they have exhausted their administrative remedies applies to land use and zoning cases. See, e.g.,
Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphne, 789 So. 2d 154, 157 (Ala. 2000); Marietta Properties v. 
City of Marietta, 732 S.E.2d 102, 106 (Ga. 2012); Wayne Property Holdings, L.L.C. v. Township of 
Wayne, 47 A.3d 54, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); Van Frank v. Salt Lake City Corp., 283 P.3d 
535 (Utah 2012); Bosonetto v. Town of Richmond, 48 A.3d 973, 980 (N.H. 2012); Stafne v. Snohomish 
County, 271 P.3d 868, 873 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).  
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agreement.74 To defeat this defense, the developer introduced into evidence 
intra-office emails and email between town staff and the FAA detailing 
how the city planned to kill the project.75 The jury was persuaded that the 
town staff’s machinations amounted to a repudiation of the contract and 
awarded the developer $43 million—or the equivalent of approximately 
$5,600 for every man woman and child in Mammoth Lakes, and three 
times the size of its annual budget.76
On appeal, the court affirmed that decision, with disastrous results for 
the town of Mammoth Lakes—the city filed for bankruptcy in 2012.77
Mammoth Lakes is significant because the case did not involve failure of a 
city to grant official land use relief. Instead, the development party was 
able to show a breach of contract when town staff, acting presumably to 
further the community’s new development goals, failed to “move a project 
along” in a general sense. The court held that the development party was 
not required to pursue administrative remedies—in this case, an application 
for a conditional use permit—because the town staff in its behavior demon-
strated a repudiation of the contract.78 Yet the town staff must have been 
surprised—they were presumably acting according to the identified needs 
of the community, and maneuvering to find a way to further that policy. 
This course of action is what planning staff are hired to do. Thus, a previ-
ous legislature, by approving that development agreement, had bound a 
subsequent legislature in a significant way: it forced them into a choice to 
reject a pressing economic development need (expansion of the airport) or 
risk defaulting on an agreement. Yet the court found no impermissible del-
egation of police powers or violation of the reserved powers doctrine. To 
the contrary, under a common law breach of contract theory, it affirmed a 
jury award that doomed an entire community to bankruptcy. 
Morgran and Mammoth Lakes highlight the delicacy of development 
agreements and get to the issue that makes them so precarious: how can a 
government act entrepreneurially to attract land use development capital 
 74. 191 Cal. App. 4th at 462. 
 75. Id. at 449-51. 
 76. Louis Sahagun, Mammoth Lakes reaches agreement with creditor it owes $43 million, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/08/mammoth-lakes.html. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 191 Cal. App. 4th at 455 (“[O]nce the Developer gave notice of default and the Town failed to 
cure the default, there was no longer a proposed land use to adjudicate in the Town’s quasi-judicial 
administrative process. At that point, all that remained was to determine whether the Town breached the 
Development Agreement and, if it did, what was the remedy. No administrative remedy would have 
sufficed.”) (citing Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. Cnty. of Placer, 81 Cal. App. 4th 577, 590 (Cal. 
App. 3d 2000). 
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without impermissibly forfeiting its defining duty, to act for the common 
wealth?
These two cases also hint at the answer: by building in to the devel-
opment agreement process a mechanism that incorporates the public good. 
Another case, Heitman v. City of Mauston Common Council,79 speaks to 
the limitations of this answer, albeit outside the development agreement 
context. 
c. Public Control of the Use of Private Property 
This subsection does not deal with development agreements in par-
ticular, but illustrates the limits to public participation over land use deci-
sions, particularly decisions that burden individualized property rights. 
While the public may see a proposed intense use as, in essence, a pub-
lic project, the developer still has significant vested rights and financial 
interests in the character of the project. In fact, the first Supreme Court 
challenge brought to a zoning ordinance in Euclid v. Ambler Realty, was a 
due process argument, alleging that zoning a property and limiting its uses 
impaired the landowner’s individual property rights without due process.80
Zoning ordinances build in process rights precisely because land use deci-
sions inherently impact individualized property rights—thus why direct 
democracy legislation may be incompatible with zoning.81
The treatment of specific zoning actions in the ballot initiative context 
can be helpful for understanding the limitations to public participation over 
specific development plans. Courts generally treat specific82 zonings and 
re-zonings as uniquely exempt from legislation by initiative.83 Even a re-
 79. 595 N.W.2d 450, 454-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
 80. 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
 81. Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making Land Use Decisions,
19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 317-18 (2001-2002). 
 82. Specific zoning actions can be distinguished from general actions where the action affects 
only localized pieces of property rather than affecting a general change to the nature of a zoning code. 
For a discussion of the distinction using the terms “site-specific” and “comprehensive,” see id. at 303-
04 . 
 83. Id. at 317 n.89; L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Town of Cumberland, 603 A.2d 311, 315 
(R.I. 1992) (“The safeguards and procedural requirements incident to the adoption or amendment of 
subdivision regulations or zoning ordinances contained in the general enabling acts are inconsistent 
with and incompatible with the exercise of direct legislation by the voters through the initiative or 
referendum process.”); Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 661 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Idaho 1983) (“[W]e 
hold that the utilization of an initiative process for zoning matters is inconsistent with the comprehen-
sive statutory procedures mandated by the Local Planning Act of 1975 to be followed in enacting and 
amending local zoning ordinances and is therefore invalid.”); Rice v. Stoff, 844 S.W.2d 529, 531 (E.D. 
Mo. 1992) (“RSMo § 353.060 (1986) mandates a public hearing. . . . This statutory require-
ment . . . would be short-circuited by the instant initiative. We therefore conclude this situation is not a 
proper one for the initiative.”); Korash v. City of Livonia, 202 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Mich. 1972) (“[T]he 
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zoning initiative of general applicability, if it burdens property owners’ 
rights, can run afoul of the due process rights guaranteed by a zoning ena-
bling statute. A Wisconsin case, Heitman v. City of Mauston Common 
Council84 neatly lays out the problem of “too much” public participation in 
land use development. 
In Heitman, a Wisconsin appellate court rejected a petition for man-
damus directing a town common council to either adopt an initiative as 
worded or refer it to the people for a vote, per a state initiative-enabling 
statute.85 The initiative was written to forbid particular types of develop-
ments, namely, “secured treatment facilities,” that housed sexually violent 
criminals. The court held that even though the initiative acted on all proper-
ties equally, the fact that in effect it “burdened” those landowners who 
could otherwise build such a facility by-right transformed the initiative into 
a zoning amendment. It thus necessarily conflicted with the zoning act, 
which vested landowners with process rights before their rights of use over 
their property could be changed.86
[I]f Mauston were to enact the land use restrictions proposed by Heitman 
under the zoning enabling act, it would be required to first submit them 
to the planning commission. All landowners would be given notice and a 
public hearing would be held. Any citizen aggrieved by the enactment of 
the restrictions would have a right of appeal. By contrast, if Heitman’s 
initiative were adopted, the owners of the land upon which use re-
strictions were placed would not be provided with a review by the plan-
ning commission, with notice, with a public hearing or with an appeals 
procedure.87
In other words, process rights act to preserve one’s more fundamental 
right against deprivation of property. Given the presumption that ballot 
initiatives are constitutionally coequal with legislative enactments by legis-
latures, an initiative that circumvented a process the legislature could not 
also legally circumvent must be ultra vires.88
The principle derived from this line of cases is that when a land use 
action may seriously impair a landowner’s rights to otherwise legally use 
their property, public or majoritarian control of the process must be bal-
anced with property rights. This distinguishes land use regulations from 
amendment to the ordinance, having been enacted by a procedure different from and contrary to the 
procedure required by the Zoning Enabling Act, is invalid.”). 
 84. 595 N.W.2d at 456-57. 
 85. Id.at 544-46. 
 86. Id. at 553. 
87. Id. at 553-54 (internal citations omitted). 
 88. Id.
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typical exercises of the police power, where notice and adjudicatory hear-
ings are not required. 
Morgran, Mammoth Lakes, and Heitman illustrate the challenge for 
governments and development parties. Although the typical regulatory and 
political land use processes can be risky for developers—and thus a deter-
rent to capital investment—the development agreement alternative, which 
is supposed to eliminate that risk, may instead just be substituting the risk 
of judicial invalidation. Conversely, local governments that permit too 
much political control over development may be restrained by the courts. 
2. Public Opposition to Development Agreements 
Regulatory and political risk to a proposed development can also be 
understood as the risk that needed entitlements—like re-zonings—will not 
be issued as a result of a change in or lack of political will. Public and pop-
ular opposition to a project often directs that political will. Public opposi-
tion to land use changes, including development agreements, can cause 
delays and introduce uncertainty into the process in its late phases, and 
often set the stage for subsequent litigation.89
Local opposition to new developments, often characterized as 
“NIMBYism”90 is so widespread91 as to be a built-in expectation for de-
velopers of controversial or high-intensity projects (such as dense housing 
or high-traffic commercial developments). As many as one in five Ameri-
cans has opposed a new development by attending hearings, writing or 
calling elected officials, or gathering petition signatures.92 This level of 
participation is unmatched in other political areas. Of those who have op-
posed development, preserving the local environment and protecting real 
estate values are the most reported motivations.93 This high degree of en-
gagement for local residents to mobilize against a proposed project should 
not be surprising given the importance of home equity as a vehicle for 
wealth creation for the American working and middle classes. 
 89. This follows naturally from two justiciability doctrines: ripeness and exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies (itself a species of ripeness). Just as a property owner may not seek a judicial remedy until 
the administrative process has played itself out, so too opponents may not seek remedy until injury 
becomes imminent through the granting of an entitlement or permission from the state. 
 90. NIMBY being an acronym for “Not In My Backyard.” See Barak D. Richman, Mandating 
Negotiations to Solve the NIMBY Problem: A Creative Regulatory Response, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 223, 223 (2002) (“NIMBY conflicts arise from projects that typically generate widely dispersed 
benefits while imposing concentrated costs.”). 
 91.  P. MICHAEL SAINT ET AL., NIMBY WARS: THE POLITICS OF LAND USE, 204 (2007). 
 92.  Id.
 93.  Id. at 205. 
802 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:2 
The inverse may also be the case: for those with little equity in abso-
lute terms, the prospect of a project that could quickly accelerate property 
value growth could also be suspect. The turbocharging of gentrification in 
urban cores with the onset of neoliberalization94 has created suspicion 
among working class city residents when a major new development is pro-
posed for their neighborhoods.95 Thus even otherwise non-objectionable or 
non-noxious development proposals risk neighbors’ wrath, depending on 
the character and history of the local community. 
The legal reporters are replete with cases of local residents bringing 
litigation to stop development,96 but they cannot tell the larger and perhaps 
more troubling problem for developers; the huge number of citizens’ asso-
ciations that participate in the administrative or entitlement stage to stop a 
development.97 The survey data suggests this opposition is not ideological 
but a result of the fear of the externalities caused by that development—
externalities like pollution, changes in property values, and decreased 
quality of life. Thus, public opposition is very fact-dependent. 
Another phenomenon bolsters the assumption that the threat to equity 
is a strong motivator. Cognitive psychologists refer to it as the endowment
effect or divestiture aversion. The endowment effect refers to an individual 
impulse to protect what one has, more than to value what one could pur-
sue—potential or unrealized gains.98 Consequently, a potential threat to 
 94.  JASON HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN AMERICAN URBANISM  78 (2007) (“[T]he neoliberal city is increasingly characterized by a curious 
combination of inner city and exurban private investment, disinvestment in the inner suburbs, the 
relaxation of land use controls, and the reduction of public investment that is not likely to lead to an 
immediate profit.”). 
 95.  For a more complete discussion of this facet of gentrification, see Travis Sumter, Move Up or 
Move Out: Gentrification and the Futility of the Intent Doctrine, 4 S. REGIONAL BLACK L. STUDENTS 
ASS’N L.J. 117, 117 (2010) (“Gentrification in the 21st century has mainly sought to supply the upper 
class with gleaming skyscrapers and upscale shopping, while disregarding the negative effects that this 
phenomenon has on African Americans and other minority communities.”); Audrey G. McFarlane, The 
New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police 
Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 21-22 (2006) (“Redevelopment’s many attractive synonyms—urban 
revitalization, regeneration, and economic development—obscure the fact that redevelopment neces-
sarily embodies, initiates and executes racial and class transformation.”); John J. Betancur, Can Gentri-
fication Save Detroit? Definition and Experiences from Chicago, 4 J. L. SOC’Y 1, 6 (2002) (“The 
context of class and race led to a highly conflictive process in which low-income people, minorities, 
and their organizations, fought hard to retain their spaces and communities, while middle class individ-
uals and their groups formed worked to take areas away from the poor and minorities. In exceptional 
cases, government mediated the process in an effort to help the disadvantaged. Most of the time, how-
ever, it intervened to accelerate or subsidize gentrification.”). 
 96.  A Westlaw search for “citizens w/25 group & oppos! & zon!” yielded more than 600 recent 
cases.
 97.  See JOHN J. DELANEY ET AL., 1 HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE § 5:25 (3d ed. 2013) (“A 
substantial number, if not a majority, of civic groups can trace their genesis to a zoning controversy.”). 
 98.  Paul B. Marrow, Behavioral Decision Theory Can Offer New Dimension to Legal Analysis of 
Motivations, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 47 (“Endowment effect: People will often place a higher value on 
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property values may be a stronger motivator than the long-term benefit of a 
broader tax base. 
By identifying the source of this opposition, we can conclude that the 
issue of public opposition is not an inherently intractable one. Instead, the 
risk associated with public opposition can presumably be controlled by 
addressing, early in the process and in a meaningful way, those externali-
ties and the impulse created by the endowment effect. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF PLANNING
The general uniformity of planning and zoning processes in the U.S. is 
a result of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and the Standard City 
Planning Enabling Act, both created in the Twentieth Century.99 The model 
zoning process balances individual property rights against public policy 
controls by vesting authority in insulated fact-finding bodies and limiting 
the amount of discretion legislatures can exercise. 
The zoning process follows this typical format: a developer initiates 
an application process with a zoning administrator or planner, typically an 
appointed official. For more complex zoning requests, such as planned 
developments, developers and city officials will typically work together to 
ensure the application meets the zoning code’s technical requirements. The 
application will then come before an appointed fact-finding body, such as a 
Board of Zoning Adjustments or Planning Commission, which will conduct 
a public hearing. These hearings may be treated as “quasi-judicial”100
where the government is applying the policy created by the city plan and 
the zoning code to adversarial parties, i.e., the proponents and opponents of 
a zoning change.101 The fact-finding body swears in witnesses, allows for 
something they already have than on the same thing if it belongs to someone else. The effect represents 
a resistance to parting with something, not an increase in its value to the owner. In one experiment, 
subjects were asked to imagine owning a coffee mug and then asked to predict a selling price. Before 
receiving the mug, the average estimated selling price was $3.73. Once they had received the mug, the 
average price jumped to $5.40.”). 
 99.  See MANDELKER supra note 13, at 34, 226. 
 100.  ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., 3 RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING PLANNING § 40:21 (4th ed. 
2013). 
 101.  See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) overruled on other 
grounds by Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, 821 P.2d 1204 (Wash. 1992). 
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan and zoning code it 
acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning code, or reclassifying land there-
under, the same body, in effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought by the pro-
ponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning change. The parties whose interest 
are affected are readily identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may per-
meate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of citizens 
than on the public generally. 
Fleming, 502 P.2d at 331. 
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cross-examination of experts, creates a record for review, and makes a 
(typically) non-binding recommendation to the city council, village board 
or County Commission, which makes the ultimate legislative determina-
tion, enjoying the typical presumption of validity accorded to legislative 
enactments. In some jurisdictions, an appointed commission or board may 
be empowered to make final decisions. 
Zoning actions are constrained to this format because of their quasi-
judicial nature and the particularized quality of the property rights in-
volved.102 However, the comprehensive planning process, and large, gener-
alized re-zonings, including high-intensity development agreements, are 
amenable to a variety of participatory approaches because they are legisla-
tive. This section of the Note will draw from several models of planning as 
potential “standard models” for the creation of high-intensity development 
agreements (and related planned developments). It will consider not only 
practical models but also more theoretical approaches to planning that 
could guide local governments in designing a process. These will include 
the mutual gains approach, a theoretical approach to dispute resolution 
propounded by Dr. Lawrence Susskind and Patrick Field of the MIT-
Harvard Public Disputes Program; the charette, a European model for par-
ticipatory planning in increasing use across the U.S.; and models from ex-
periments in participatory government in U.S. cities. 
A. The Mutual Gains Approach 
The mutual gains approach is a theoretical approach to dispute resolu-
tion between private parties or the government and an adversarial portion 
of the public.103 As throughout this Note, the inclusion of the Mutual Gains 
Approach (“MGA”) presumes a potentially or predictably contentious situ-
ation arising upon publication of notice for a proposed development 
agreement. The mutual gains approach counsels organizations to treat “the 
interaction with the public as a multiparty, multi-issue negotiation.” The 
objectives of the MGA include: 
1. Acknowledging the concerns of opposing parties; 
2. Engaging in joint fact finding; 
3. Creating contingency plans to minimize impacts of a project, 
and make commitments to compensate for predictable costs; 
 102.  Because a zoning map amendment or re-zoning deals with the use of a particular piece of 
property, there is always a greater potential for a property owner to bear the burden of a government 
action and thus be able to show injury. 
 103.  LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELDS, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL 
GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 13 (1996). 
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4. Making explicit declarations of responsibility, acknowledge 
mistakes and share power in a real way; 
5. Acting in a trustworthy fashion; 
6. Focus on building long-term relationships. 
These six principles of the MGA are designed to meet general objec-
tives of responsiveness, quality, and problem solving.104 They also address 
one of the problems that face development parties and governments in land 
use scenarios: asymmetrical information and public mistrust. 
At the core of these types of public disputes is a phenomenon social 
psychologist Lee Ross terms naïve realism.105 Naïve realism describes the 
belief that individuals perceive reality objectively, and therefore that their 
beliefs about the world are the result of rational interpretation of data. 
Therefore, disagreements over policy issues in particular must be due to 
irrationality in adverse parties.106 If one party believes their policy oppo-
nents are misinterpreting data or behaving irrationally, they are unlikely to 
credit the possibility of cooperation or compromise. 
Susskind and Fields point to a study by Elizabeth Newton at Stanford 
University to illustrate this point.107 In this study, one group of subjects 
were given popular songs and told to tap out the melodies to another group 
of subjects who were asked to identify the songs. While the tappers esti-
mated the listeners would be able to identify the song fifty percent of the 
time, the success rate was actually less than three percent.108 In the study, 
the tappers would grow increasingly frustrated that the listeners could not 
accurately interpret the information they were communicating.109
The analogy to land use disputes around development agreements is 
more evident than may be apparent. By the time the details of a proposed 
development—or even the fact of its existence—reaches the public, the 
developer and the local government have likely already engaged in months 
or even years of negotiations. The substance of negotiations between prop-
erty owners and planning staffs may not even be available to vigilant resi-
dents because negotiations do not require public notice110 and drafts of 
 104.  Id. at 14. 
 105.  Id. at 18. 
 106.  Id. at 19. 
 107.  Id. at 37. 
 108.  Id. at 19. 
 109.  Id.
 110.  Zoning codes typically require notice when a concrete proposal to amend a zoning code or 
zoning map is going to go before a public body. See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
§ 4 (rev. ed. 1928) [hereinafter STANDARD ACT]. 
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plans and proprietary information are not subject to Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests.111
City planning staff have two reasons for engaging in such intensive 
negotiations: an entrepreneurial one, serving local governments’ need to 
attract capital as a way to fund government and encourage growth, and a 
regulatory one, serving the public health, safety, and general welfare to the 
extent possible given property owners’ vested rights under the existing 
zoning and land use regulations. In other words, city staff may view nego-
tiations as a vehicle for mitigating externalities and shaping a proposed 
project to meet local needs. 
Developers have a number of interests in engaging in closely-held ne-
gotiations with city staff before going before a public body. First, once a 
proposal is submitted to the government for review, public scrutiny is trig-
gered in the form of both notice requirements112 and applicability of free-
dom of information rules,113 and what may be an inchoate plan could spark 
unnecessary concern or misplaced enthusiasm from the community. Sec-
ond, there is also a competitive disadvantage in revealing a development 
plan to potential competitors early on in the process; it gives them an op-
portunity to interfere or seek a competitive position in the community. This 
is particularly true for commercial developments seeking to capture market 
share—for example, a developer seeking to build a grocery store in an oth-
erwise underserved but growing area. 
As a result, by the time residents become aware of a major develop-
ment project being proposed in their community, both the developer and 
the government may be trying to sell it to them. But having been excluded 
from the process, residents may not be willing or able to hear the tune be-
ing tapped out. 
It is easy in such a situation for developers and supportive city plan-
ners on one side, and the public on the other, to view the situation with 
distrust. “Naïve realism” helps explain the adversarial posture that can 
develop in such situations: those who support the development see the best 
possible plan built on the best available evidence; those who oppose it see 
one-sided evidence and collusion between a property owner and govern-
ment officials. 
 111.  UNIF. INFORMATION PRACTICES CODE § 2-103(a)(5) (“(a) This article does not require disclo-
sure of: . . . (5) information which, if disclosed, would frustrate government procurement or give an 
advantage to any person proposing to enter into a contract or agreement with an agency.”). 
 112.  See STANDARD ACT, supra note 110., at § 4. 
 113.  See, e.g., UNIF. INFORMATION PRACTICES CODE § 2-103(a)(5). 
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For instance, according to one study, sixty-nine percent of Americans 
think the relationship between developers and the government makes the 
planning process unfair.114 The incentive for government and developers to 
cooperate to generate a compromise agreement before presenting it to the 
public contributes to this perception, and public anxiety over the externali-
ties of that project provide excellent motivation to fight the project. 
In such a scenario, the mutual gains principles of joint fact-finding and 
creating contingency plans to minimize impacts are of particular relevance. 
In the land use context, litigation often arises over public participation in 
the administrative fact-finding phase.115 Short of litigation, public oppo-
nents of a development may seek to sway a public agency or derail a pro-
ject by entering countervailing or critical evidence that provides the admin-
administrative agency with enough evidence to reject a development.116 A 
process for joint fact-finding circumvents this common feature of develop-
ment fights. 
Two presumptions operate together to recommend the creation of mit-
igation plans. Mitigation plans are another principle of the Mutual Gains 
Approach. The first is the presumption that development opponents are 
motivated by threats to the environment, home values or the generalized 
threat of gentrification; the second is the presumption that the endowment 
effect operates in these adversarial situations. These two relatively safe 
assumptions suggest that by making contingent but real commitments to 
the public—organized citizen associations and/or neighbors—the mutual 
gains approach can facilitate a more efficient land use plan that fulfills the 
needs of both the public and the developer. 
B. The Charrette Model 
The term “charrette” describes a set of closely-related practical models 
for public participation in land use planning. Different organizations have 
different, sometimes proprietary models of charrettes, but there is an identi-
 114.  SAINT ET AL, supra note 91, at 204. 
 115.  See, e.g., Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 326, 344 (2001) (“And since [probative evidence] first appeared in supplemental information 
supplied to the County shortly before the Board convened, there was little opportunity for public com-
ment and meaningful response as to either the methodology or the evidence to support the figures 
used.”).
 116.  See DELANEY, supra note 97, at § 5:30 (“Rebuttal evidence, demonstrating why the proposal, 
if approved, would have an adverse impact upon public health, safety, and welfare, must then be intro-
duced. Thus, as a practical matter, counsel for the citizens association is free to adopt a “sniper strate-
gy,” in contrast to the comprehensive approach that applicant’s counsel must undertake. In order to 
succeed, the opposition need only raise serious doubts regarding one or more of the matters of proof the 
applicant is required to meet (e.g., traffic impact).”). 
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fiable, general process. A “charrette team” is chosen by a developer, a gov-
ernment, or both, to lead the process. This team, typically working as con-
sultants, is comprised of professionals, experts, and technocrats from a 
number of fields such as urban planning, environmental planning, architec-
ture, traffic engineering, economics, etc. This team is usually headed by a 
facilitator with ultimate decision-making authority over the team. 
The charrette team will identify interested parties, ideally both those 
with positive and negative interests in the project. These are the “stake-
holders” who will participate in the charrette. Typical stakeholders are of 
course the developer and the local government (including if necessary dif-
ferent agencies or bodies—such as departments of transportation and 
school districts), chambers of commerce, conservation groups, and site 
neighbors either individually or as represented by homeowners associations 
or ad hoc groups.117 The stakeholders are provided with notice of the char-
rette, and information meetings may be held to inform them of the opera-
tion of a charrette. 
An initial, “visionary” meeting is held. At this meeting, stakeholders 
will be put into small, representative groups, and encouraged to hash out 
“wish lists” or general visions for a given property. The charrette team may 
not tell participants about the extant restrictions on property uses if it is 
theoretically within the power of the government agency to change those 
restrictions to accommodate different uses.118 Subsequent meetings will 
incorporate review and comments by stakeholders on those initial visions. 
The development party and the government will offer presentations as to 
preferences and legal or practical limitations on the development. Typical-
ly, several more meetings are held as stakeholders provide feedback that is 
needed to come to a “final” charrette plan. 
Charrettes are often used as a way to get “stakeholder buy-in” before 
an official proposal, but the final charrette plan is typically not binding;  
however, it can be as some jurisdictions have written charrettes into the 
planning code.119 In these jurisdictions, the final plan produced by the pro-
cess may be used to rezone the property, or become an “overlay district” 
which controls the ultimate development of the property.120
A charrette has several advantages: First, it insulates government and 
development parties from charges of collusion or untoward secrecy. Sec-
 117.  For a concise but generalized description of the charette process, see Dino C. La Fiandra, 
Charrettes in Site Design and Land Use Regulation, 39 MD. B.J. Sep.-Oct. 2006, at 31, 32. 
 118.  Id.
 119.  Id. at 34. 
 120.  Id. 
2014] PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL GOVERNMENT 809 
ond, it allows adversarial stakeholders to air grievances and concerns early 
on in the process and expend energy and resources that would otherwise 
later be directed at defeating the project to improving it. However, there are 
of course disadvantages. For instance, because the developer or the gov-
ernment selects the charrette team, they may either in fact or appearance 
not be a purely neutral party; and in most jurisdictions, the results of a char-
rette are not binding. In addition, for the development party, the process is 
inherently unpredictable and may produce an undesirable result. 
V. A PARTICIPATORY PLANNING MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS
This section purports to offer an ameliorative model by synthesizing 
into a model plan the lessons of adverse litigation, public opposition to 
development, and alternative models of planning. Specifically, four ele-
ments will be proposed: transparency requirements, statutory triggers for 
public participation, joint fact-finding, and “certainty commitments” for 
development parties, the government, and elements of the public. 
A. Transparency Requirements 
Developers and governments both have an interest in keeping negotia-
tions on development agreements quiet. For the former, screening off com-
petition and protecting trade secrets are just as important as preventing the 
public from becoming inflamed against an incipient plan. For the latter, the 
major concern is inviting intrusive and unwarranted scrutiny from the pub-
lic at a point where the plan is not in its final or even preliminary form. 
The concern over scrutiny is justifiable, but secrecy is a not inherently 
beneficial for several reasons. First, secrecy may heighten the public per-
ception of collusion between planning staff and a developer. Second, the 
prevalence of comprehensive planning documents reduces the expectation 
of privacy over the fact of development of a particular property: because 
comprehensive plans generally announce a city’s plan to put undeveloped 
properties to use, the fact that a property is being considered for develop-
ment will not come as a significant surprise to competitors. Lastly, details 
and trade secrets related to a development can still be obscured while the 
fact of plans for a property is released to the public or a segment thereof. 
Providing notice that a major proposal is in the works can work two 
goals. First, it provides a prerequisite to involving the public in planning—
without notice, the public would obviously be unable to meaningfully par-
ticipate in any process. Second, it serves the normative goal of transparency 
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and evaporates the dampening perception of collusion between government 
and development parties. Three statutory requirements could be imple-
mented into city planning codes to increase transparency without unneces-
sarily gumming up the works for developers and local governments: 
1. Announcement of Negotiations and Progress 
Currently notice requirements typically apply only when an applica-
tion for specific zoning relief has been submitted to a public body like a 
Planning Commission or a City Council, although an application may be-
come subject to freedom of information laws as soon as a planning official, 
such a zoning administrator, receives it in its tentative form. A typical no-
tice requirement compels the government or the developer to send certified 
letters to property owners within a specified distance from the project (e.g., 
within a 500 foot radius from the property line) and post a notice of a cer-
tain size on the property itself, or to place a notice in a newspaper of gen-
eral circulation.121
Any notice given before a formal application will not fall under an en-
abling statute’s ambit, and therefore the notice would not have to be gener-
alized—specialized early notice can be designed to inform only the most 
intensely interested parties. Significant discretion can be granted to gov-
ernments and development parties as to the timing, substance, and focus of 
this kind of notice. 
Consider the notice requirement from the City of Chicago’s Zoning 
and Land Use ordinance,122 which details the variable notice requirements 
 121.  See, e.g., W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutory Notice Require-
ments Prerequisite to Adoption or Amendment of Zoning Ordinance or Regulation, 96 A.L.R. 2d 449 
(1964) (“Units of local government such as cities, towns, and counties ordinarily derive the zoning 
power from the state by virtue of an enabling statute or an appropriate section of their charter. Oftener 
than not, these statutes or charter provisions require that a notice be given to designated property own-
ers or to the public at large preliminary to the exercise of the zoning power therein granted. Notice 
published in a newspaper a specified number of days before the hearing to be held on the matter is the 
usual requirement of the statute or charter provision, but service by mail or in person is called for in 
some of them.”). 
 122.  MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILL. § 17-13-0107-A (2013). 
Written Notice. Whenever the provisions of this Zoning Ordinance require that “Written No-
tice” be provided, such notice must be given as specified in this section. 
1. Timing. 
(a) One written notice of administrative adjustment applications must be provided 
by the applicant at least 10 days before the Zoning Administrator takes action on 
the application. The Zoning Administrator may not take final action on 
an administrative adjustment application until at least 10 days after the date that no-
tices were mailed to abutting property owners.
(b) One written notice for all other applications requiring written notice must be 
provided by the applicant no more than 30 days before filing the application. 
2. Radius. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the notification radius for applications re-
quiring written notice is as follows: 
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for different varieties of land use actions. The city requires different inten-
sities of notice based on the intensity of use being requested. Applying this 
rationale, a notice requirement may be crafted which reduces the likelihood 
of unnecessarily spooking the public (the following is taken from the Chi-
cago Zoning Ordinance, with my additions in bold): 
Written Notice. Whenever the provisions of this Zoning Ordinance re-
quire that “Written Notice” be provided, such notice must be given as spec-
ified in this section. 
1. Timing. 
 (x) Written notice of negotiations to enter into a development 
agreement must be provided by the applicant within at least 30 days of 
an initial meeting between agents of the city and agents of the develop-
er or property owner. Informal written and telephonic communica-
tions shall not be considered meetings for the purpose of this 
requirement.
2. Radius. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the notification radius 
for applications requiring written notice is as follows: 
….
 (x) In the case of negotiations to enter into development agree-
ments, the applicant must provide written notice only to the Alder-
man/representative of the legislative district in which the subject 
property is located, or where there is no such representative, to the 
presiding legislator of the body responsible for referring applications 
for relief to the legislature as a whole. The city may at its discretion 
post a notice for public viewing for no less than ten days on a publicly 
(a) In the case of special use applications and zoning map amendments, including 
planned developments, written notice must be provided to property owners of the 
subject property and to all property owners within 250 feet of the property lines of 
the subject property. 
. . . . 
(c) In the case of administrative adjustment applications, the applicant must provide 
written notice to property owners of abutting lots on both sides of the subject prop-
erty. 
. . . . 
3. All required written notices must be sent USPS first class mail unless otherwise ex-
pressly stated. 
. . . . 
5. Written notices must contain: 
(a) the common street address of the subject property, 
(b) a description of the nature, scope and purpose of the application or proposal; 
(c) the name and address of the applicant; 
(d) the date that the applicant intends to file the application; and 
(e) a source for additional information on the application or proposal. 
Id. 
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viewable bulletin board in the official office of the noticed legislator, 
within thirty days of receiving notice from the developer.
False
X. Written notices must contain:
(a) the common street address of the subject property, 
(b) a description of the nature, scope and purpose of the application 
or proposal; 
(c) the name and address of the applicant; 
(d) the date that the applicant intends to file the application; and 
(e) a source for additional information on the application or pro-
posal. 
With the exception that notices to enter into negotiations to enter 
development agreements must contain only (a) and (c), and the fol-
lowing: 
(f) the current use classifications of the subject property; 
(g) the current designation of use of the property in the Comprehen-
sive Plan. 
For example, formally providing notice only to the affected alderman 
allows a duly elected official to make a determination as to the necessity of 
disseminating the information to the public, in constituent newsletter, on a 
website, or by any other appropriate means. Limiting the information that 
must be contained in public notices provides information to the public 
without revealing what may be tentative plans. 
Related to this element would be a requirement to publish significant 
progress in negotiations. This could be no more than a requirement that the 
developer inform the same party about an intent to file a formal application, 
per (d) above, sixty days before the anticipated date of application, with a 
requirement that requirement (b) be also included in that notice. 
2. Broader Notice Requirements Upon Application 
At the point of application for approval of a development agreement, a 
broader notice requirement in terms of timing and effected area “radius” 
(both literal and figurative) satisfies the principle of including the greater 
number of potential stakeholders. Note that in the charrette model de-
scribed in § IV, supra, the charrette team will pull together a group of vari-
ous stakeholders that includes but is not limited to nearby property owners. 
The reasoning is that major land use changes have an impact beyond that 
on the immediate geographic neighbors—including on small business own-
ers, school districts, etc. 
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However, notice requirements are not as amenable to this type of dis-
cretion because they are binding on a developer and government,123 and a 
nebulous requirement would jeopardize a proposal’s progress on procedur-
al grounds.124 Therefore, requiring giving notice to specified agencies, and 
expanding the radius for required notice to property owners could enhance 
transparency without introducing uncertainty for the developer. In this re-
gard, the following elements would enhance transparency: 
1. For development agreements, increase the radius for notice by 
a factor of 1.5 to 2; 
2. Require notice be sent to affected school districts or other af-
fected taxing bodies, elected officials from overlapping legis-
lative districts (such as state representatives and 
Congressmen), and regional planning or conservation agen-
cies with jurisdiction. 
3. Increase the lead-time by a factor of 1.5 or 2, such that after 
submitting notice, an official hearing (or related process, e.g., 
a charrette) could not be held for 45 or 60 days rather than 30 
(or 90 days rather than 60, etc.). 
4. Do not require a formal hearing within a certain time frame 
from an Initial Meeting. 
B. Participation Triggers 
Not all development agreements are controversial. Often they are 
merely vehicles to control costs, including the provisioning of quotidian 
planning elements like streetlights or sewer lines. Thus planning reforms 
that acted on all development agreements would be needlessly broad. In-
stead, development agreements of certain intensities could be tagged as 
triggering a requirement for greater transparency and participation re-
quirements.
These triggers could be of several types: classes of uses; particular 
types of regulatory relief; or multiple level up-zonings including mixed 
uses or planned developments. 
Conditioning greater participation requirements on particular classes 
of uses involved would ensure that only those development agreements that 
 123.  See Crais III, supra note 121, at 449 (“Applicable statutes calling for notice in a particular 
manner and form preliminary to the adoption or amendment of a zoning law are generally construed as 
mandatory and jurisdictional so that measures passed in contravention thereof are invalid.”). 
 124.  See Wright v. City of Shelbyville, No. M200900321COAR3CV, 2009 WL 3631019 (Tenn. 
App. 2009) (insufficient notice is grounds for invaliding amendment to zoning ordinance). 
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contemplate commonly objectionable, noxious, or impactful uses125 com-
pel public participation. Examples of such uses would be waste handling or 
storage facilities, power stations, quarries or mining operations, industrial 
or logistical uses (such as intermodal transportation operations) and casi-
nos. Given the greater scrutiny afforded to these types of proposals, requir-
ing greater transparency and participation in arriving at a development 
agreement is not particularly controversial. Because these types of uses will 
be less flexible as to design—unlike mixed uses, there is not much variabil-
ity in industrial-style uses. 
Particular types of regulatory relief, such as air quality permits, Army 
Corps of Engineer 404 (affecting navigable waters) permits, FAA per-
mits,126 or hazardous materials storage permits, would similarly prompt 
public participation in the creation of mitigation measures. In these cases, 
superseding statutes would limit the possible range of public input. Like the 
above, this would not be significant departure from the already intense 
level of scrutiny public agencies give to these types of projects. 
Multiple level up-zonings, including planned developments with 
mixed uses, would be broader and likely pull in a significant number of the 
development agreements generally proposed. The basic idea is that where a 
development agreement entails “up-zoning” of more than one level,127 or to 
a wholly different category of use (such as from residential to commercial), 
the transparency and participation requirements will kick in. Because they 
are typically vast in size, development agreements often, though not al-
ways, include parcels not yet annexed into a municipality, and thus zoned 
for a general agricultural use. Agricultural uses are the least intense, so 
most zoning changes would require multiple-level up-zonings. Planned 
developments and mixed-use developments are often coterminous: they act 
as their own zoning designation, subject to particular controls detailed in 
the “plan” for the development. This category of uses is not inherently 
noxious, but the impacts on communities and neighbors could be great. It is 
with these types of developments that a charrette-style process would be 
 125.  For a quantitative discussion of commonly opposed uses, see SAINT ET AL., supra note 91, at 
207-212. 
 126.  As for example with hospitals that include helipads to service emergency medicine opera-
tions.
 127.  “Levels” refers to a remnant of cumulative zoning, which created levels of zoning; as the 
levels went up, they incorporated the uses from the lower levels, and added more. In the contemporary 
context, however, each zoning classification is often exclusive but do include gradations that permit 
greater and greater intensity of uses (for example, an “R1” district permits single family homes, but an 
“R5” permits multi-unit apartment buildings of 25 units or more). For a discussion of cumulative zon-
ing, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 381 (1926). 
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most useful, since design and operations issues can address many con-
cerns.128
Joint fact-finding would take the form of a process requirement, but 
there are a number of possibilities for the substance of such a requirement. 
The language of the fact-finding process delegated to planning commis-
sions may be a useful starting point.129 In considering a planned develop-
ment, a plan commission will be charged with evaluating at least the 
following factors: (1) compliance with standards and guidelines for the 
proposed use; (2) compatibility with the uses, character, and density of the 
surrounding area; and (3) adequacy of public infrastructure and city ser-
vices. An additional requirement, evaluating the economic impact of vari-
ous alternatives of use, can be added to address externality concerns. The 
principle of joint fact-finding suggests that the public, or interested agen-
cies, will be solicited to submit third parties to generate, or particular 
standards of evaluation to be used in generating, the evidence to address 
these issues. 
C. A Participatory Process 
The charrette provides a good model for a planning process that could 
be incorporated when creating a development agreement. After noticing the 
necessary parties and soliciting input on fact-finding, a participatory plan-
ning meeting, with features of a public hearing and a charrette, would be 
convened to generate a model plan for the subject property. A planning 
agency can train staff to act as facilitators, or contract outside parties to act 
as facilitators; in either case, developers can be compelled to subsidize that 
cost through permit fees. 
Statutory language should restrict the areas of debate to issues amena-
ble to planning: those elements of a project, which require technical exper-
tise or professional knowledge, such as civil engineering, should be outside 
 128.  Examples of design improvements would be moving ingress and egress points, providing 
screening and landscaping buffers for residential neighbors, mitigating light and noise spillover, or 
incorporation of a historical local aesthetic. Examples of operations improvements would be restricting 
hours of operation, confining the time of truck deliveries, and funding for site security. 
 129.  See, e.g., MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILL. § 17-13-0609:  
17-13-0609 Review and Decision-Making Criteria. In reviewing and making decisions on 
proposed planned developments, review bodies and decision-making bodies must consider at 
least the following factors: 
17-13-0609-A whether the proposed development complies with the standards and 
guidelines of Sec. 17-8-0900; 
17-13-0609-B whether the proposed development is compatible with the character of the 
surrounding area in terms of uses, density and building scale; and 
17-13-0609-C whether public infrastructure facilities and city services will be adequate 
to serve the proposed development at the time of occupancy. 
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the ambit of such planning meetings. However, the mixture of uses, general 
design standards, operational limitations, and substantially related exac-
tions, such as paying for road widening or new bike lanes, adding a bus 
stop or funding additional fire department equipment or training, should be 
included, as these are matter inherently part of the general health, safety, 
and welfare. 
As with a charrette, stakeholders would be invited to participate in a 
series of meetings that result in a project plan of sufficient specificity to 
notice the community at large about the general character of the coming 
project. At the same time, the plan would be general enough to permit the 
development party and planning staff to refine it to meet technical stand-
ards and satisfy the economic interests of the developer. 
D. Reducing Risk for Development Parties 
Increasing transparency and public participation supports the integrity 
of the planning process and mitigates risk for development parties and the 
government, in an imprecise way. This section offers statutory and admin-
istrative fixes that may provide for more security in securing entitlements. 
The reforms suggested to this point intend to satisfy the public interest 
in land use decisions. They are meant to mitigate public distrust, address 
the community’s policy objectives at an early point in the negotiations, 
ameliorate fears of uncompensated externalities, and allow for a mild form 
of expression of the police power.130 The other side of the development 
agreement process is to provide the development party with some guaran-
tees to mitigate the risk of a rejection of the agreements or the larding of 
the agreement with onerous conditions. 
Two elements operating together could provide this security: an in-
cremental fact-finding process and a cumulative standard for approval. 
1. Incremental Fact-Finding Process and Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies
Insofar as a charrette, or similar process, notices the public and solicits 
involvement in the development process, it may be considered a fact-
finding process for the purpose of creating an administrative record, and a 
form of administrative remedy. Zoning is a creature of statute and thus the 
administrative process is defined by the particular zoning or planning stat-
 130.  That is, regulation of land uses is an expression of the police power, Euclid at 387, and thus 
the process for shaping a particular regulation is an expression of that power. 
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utes. For a general sense of the law of administrative remedy, federal pro-
cedure offers guidance. 
Generally speaking, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies has two facets; first, a duty on objectors to administrative deci-
sions to avail themselves of all non-judicial administrative processes before 
seeking judicial review, and second, an implicit waiving of issues not 
raised before administrative bodies.131
The Supreme Court discussed the animating jurisprudential principles 
underlying the administrative exhaustion doctrine in two military draft 
cases, McKart v. United States132 and McGee v. United States.133 In 
McKart, the government indicted a draft resister and tried to bar his claim 
that he was exempt from the draft because he had not challenged with the 
draft board his reclassification as “available for military service,” after his 
“sole surviving son” status expired with the death of his mother. In reject-
ing the government’s argument, the Court detailed the purposes of the ex-
haustion doctrine. Among these were that “judicial review may be hindered 
by the failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or 
to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise.”134 Exceptions would be 
recognized where the interest of the statute do not outweigh the “severe” 
harm to the challenging party.135 In McKart, the fact that criminal penalties 
would arise was a heavy factor to acknowledge an exception. 
In the land use context, harm to the challenging party (project oppo-
nents) would rarely rise to the level of criminal penalties. More important-
ly, the interest in allowing the public agency to create a factual record is a 
pressing one given the volume of land use decisions and the “quasi-
judicial” nature of land use decisions. Zoning and planning codes detail 
with specificity the requirements of such hearings and fact-finding. Unlike 
McKart, the local agencies are rarely if ever charged with issues of statuto-
ry construction,136 and thus the local agency administrative process is 
 131.  33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & DUDLEY W. WOODBRIDGE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE. § 8398 (1st ed.) (“One challenging an agency decision must exhaust all 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Related is the requirement, often included under 
the exhaustion doctrine, that one must raise issues with the agency or lose the right to challenge those 
issues on review. Particularly important are the instances in which courts will entertain a claim for an 
exception to exhaustion, listed and discussed below.”). 
 132.  395 U.S. 185 (1969). 
 133.  402 U.S. 479 (1971). 
 134.  395 U.S. at 194. 
 135.  Id. at 197. 
 136.  Id. at 197-98 (“The question of whether petitioner is entitled to exemption as a sole surviving 
son is, as we have seen, solely one of statutory interpretation. The resolution of that issue does not 
require any particular expertise on the part of the appeal board; the proper interpretation is certainly not 
a matter of discretion.”).  
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meant to facilitate fact-finding and allow for the application of expertise 
and exercising of discretion. These rationales were specifically identified 
by the Court in McKart as persuasive justifications for barring claims that 
did not exhaust administrative remedies. 
A charrette-style planning process would necessarily be part of the 
fact-finding process. First, it would entail a notice requirement, thus justify-
ing the presumption that interested parties had an opportunity to participate 
on their own behalf. Secondly and more importantly, it would create a plan 
or set of parameters against which the legislature would judge a final pro-
posal.
Thus potential objecting litigants would be precluded from attacking a 
project if they failed to in essence inform the development party and the 
planning agency of their objections at an early point in the process, where 
they could be ameliorated. This is the precise intent of the exhaustion doc-
trine in general and the planning process in particular: to allow administra-
tive agencies to apply statutory land use standards to particular factual 
scenarios. 
Further, even where litigants could raise substantive challenges to a 
project, such as failure to comply with comprehensive plan objectives or 
arbitrary and unreasonable application of the terms of a zoning ordi-
nance,137 their cause of action would be barred or impaired by a failure to 
raise the issue and create a record for the determining agency to review. 
An explicit recognition in a planning ordinance or enabling statute of 
the charrette-style meetings as evidentiary and part of the record for review 
would accomplish this risk-mitigation measure. Relatedly, acknowledging 
the product of that participatory planning process as a part of the adminis-
trative record can limit discretion and increase a development party’s abil-
ity to challenge an adverse decision judicially. 
 137.  These claims typically turn on the presentation of “clear and convincing evidence” that the 
agency acted arbitrarily and unreasonably given the record before it. See 4 SALKIN, E. PATRICIA,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 42:38 (5th ed. 2013) (“A reviewing court will disturb a decision of a 
board of adjustment only if it is found to be illegal, fraudulent, clearly erroneous, unreasonable, arbi-
trary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Dist. of 
Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 309 A.2d 314, 319 (D.C. 1973) (“Our only duty, then, in review-
ing this order is to determine whether detailed findings were made upon each material contested issue 
of fact, Dietrich v. BZA, D.C.App., 293 A.2d 470 (1972), whether those findings are supported by and 
in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole of the administrative 
record, Schiffmann v. ABC Board, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 235 (1973), and whether the conclusions of the 
Board flow rationally from these findings, Stewart v. BZA, D.C.App., 305 A.2d 516 (1973).”) (empha-
sis added). 
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2. Narrowing the Range of Discretion 
The product of a collaborative early planning process could not be 
binding because of the legislative assignation to local governments of dis-
cretionary powers to plan for the health, safety, and general welfare. Dis-
cretion however must be exercised based on the record created through the 
hearing and fact-finding process. A plan produced through a collaborative 
process could be designated as a guiding document because it synthesizes 
facts and evidence entered in the fact-finding process. 
More concretely, development parties could find security in a statuto-
ry requirement that legislatures (or other final decision-making bodies) 
limit their discretion in adverse judgments that a final plan represents a 
substantial departure from the final plan produced by a charrette. In other 
words, the final decision-maker can be constrained from denying a pro-
posed plan except in those cases where the final plan represents a signifi-
cant departure from the charrette plan. A narrower range of discretion 
increases certainty that approvals will eventually be granted so long as the 
basic terms of project plan are satisfied. Predictability could be additionally 
bolstered by detailing what standards should be applied in determining a 
“substantial” departure. 
Such “decision-making criteria” guidelines are common to zoning or-
dinances. As one example, the City of Chicago’s zoning ordinance contains 
the following section controlling decision-making on planned development 
districts:
17-13-0609 Review and Decision-Making Criteria. In reviewing 
and making decisions on proposed planned developments, review bodies 
and decision-making bodies must consider at least the following factors: 
17-13-0609-A whether the proposed development complies with the 
standards and guidelines of Sec. 17-8-0900; 
17-13-0609-B whether the proposed development is compatible with 
the character of the surrounding area in terms of uses, density and building 
scale; and 
17-13-0609-C whether public infrastructure facilities and city services 
will be adequate to serve the proposed development at the time of occupan-
cy.138
It would be relatively straightforward therefore to craft such a deci-
sion-making criteria provision applicable to development agreements. Such 
a provision would require only that a substantial departure from a prelimi-
nary plan be based on factors such as: whether the contemplated use is 
 138.  MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILL. § 17-13-0609 (2013). 
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substantially similar to that in the charrette plan; whether the proposed 
development reflects the objectives of the charrette plan; whether the miti-
gation provisions are not inferior to those in the charrette plan. The es-
sence of discretion is that some ambiguity exists, so these criteria cannot be 
quantitative. Nevertheless, having such guiding criteria would encourage 
extreme caution on the part of local governments. To deny a project for any 
but a narrow range of reasons could subject them to judicial review. 
At the same time, that restraint on discretion accounts for public par-
ticipation. In other words, because of the greater degree of public participa-
tion throughout the process, discretion is being restrained in deference to 
public concerns over health, safety, and general welfare as expressed in the 
planning process. This creates a qualitative distinction from contract zon-
ing, where the concern is the binding of the legislature from exercising its 
police powers in order to confer a private benefit.
This fix comports with the slight but extant trend to consider the out-
come of a contractual relationship between the government and a develop-
ment party rather than find it inherently ultra vires.139 Applying this 
narrowed-discretion reform to the facts and reasoning in Morgran Co., Inc. 
v. Orange County, its benefits become immediately apparent. 
The court in Morgran found the development agreement to be unen-
forceable in large part because it would have transformed a quasi-judicial 
proceeding and legislative deliberation to mere “pro forma exercise[s].”140
In other words, even a nebulous commitment to “support” a proposal, 
crafted in a context where both parties were aware of the presumed illegali-
ty of contract zoning, would have impermissibly tainted the neutral pro-
cesses of fact-finding administrative hearings and legislative deliberations. 
If, however, Morgran Company had engaged in a participatory process to 
develop an initial plan, even a somewhat vague one, the objectionable ele-
ments—somewhat dense residential developments—could not have pro-
vided the sole grounds for rejection of a proposal. The commitment for 
support would have been unnecessary; the developer would have had the 
security of knowing that even if conditions in the community had changed, 
the basic elements necessary to make their plan profitable would be pro-
 139.  See, e.g., BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING 
INVITATIONS TO ABUSE OF DISCRETION § 7.03[1], at 262 (2002) (“[S]ome state legislatures have taken 
the step of expressly authorizing contract zoning. I think [the] judicial trend away from finding contract 
zoning inherently flawed on police power and statutory grounds is salutary; it is far more useful to look 
at the timing, structure, and outcome of an actual contractual relationship between the local government 
and the developer or landowner.”). 
 140.  Morgran Co., Inc. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 643 (citing Chung v. Sarasota County, 
686 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1996)). 
2014] PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL GOVERNMENT 821 
tected. With no bi-lateral commitment on the part of the legislature, there 
would be nothing to invalidate. 
Where a commitment to zone is not authorized by statute, even a 
vague commitment to zone may be held unenforceable by a court, as Mor-
gran shows. By expanding the fact-finding stage, the opportunity for late-
stage challenges diminishes, and the grounds upon which such a challenge 
may be brought are narrowed based on the doctrine of administrative reme-
dies exhaustion. Limiting the discretion of decision-making bodies to artic-
ulated factors based on a participatory process, certainty for development 
parties increases in a way not susceptible to judicial invalidation by a court. 
Taken in toto, the foregoing participatory elements accomplish several 
goals: first, they serve normatively desirable public participation and trans-
parency practices; second, they defuse likely political and legal opposition 
by incorporating likely objectors into the process at an early and thus less 
high-stakes stage; third, they increase certainty of approval for develop-
ment parties; and last, they preserve an important tool for governments 
forced by a macro policy and economic regimes into entrepreneurial behav-
ior.
V. CONCLUSION
In the era of entrepreneurial government, development agreements be-
tween development parties and local governments have become invaluable 
tools. Development agreements provide numerous benefits, allowing for 
flexibility and certainty despite a traditionally and somewhat unpredictable 
and rigid statutory regime. Despite general acceptance by courts, develop-
ment agreements implicate certain judicial doctrines that make them sus-
ceptible to litigation. Their very nature also encourages suspicion from the 
public because of a perception that they are anti-democratic and impermis-
sibly bind governments from exercising their police powers. A participa-
tory model of planning that both encourages community participation and 
reduces risk for the developer and municipality could avoid the inefficien-
cies that come with opaque and undemocratic planning, but provide the 
certainty and flexibility developers and governments need in order to spur 
economic development. 
